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Article 8

PROHIBITION IN AMERICA:
A BAD RAP AND A BIASED ACCOUNT
By Laura Smith

Since December 5, 1933, scholars have debated and struggled to determine
the true results of Prohibition in America. Authors have written countless works
trying to answer these questions, some hailing, but most criticizing, the
amendment that transformed American drinking culture. A careful study of the
topic reveals contradictory statistics, rampant biases, outside factors, and
generalizations galore that prevent historians from completely uncovering
Prohibition’s specific results. What can be seen, however, is that the effects
Prohibition did have were not as negative as historians so long claimed and,
perhaps even more importantly for this audience, the repercussions of
Prohibition are no longer present today.
In the Prohibition debate, one thing is certain: America’s relationship with
alcohol was getting out of control and had been for a long time. Americans had
always had a history of drinking hard liquor and often in excessive amounts,
especially during the last half of the eighteenth and the majority of the
nineteenth century. Herbert Asbury describes the period in his renowned work,
The Great Illusion: An Informal History of Prohibition. He writes, “The aged
and infirm sipped toddies of rum and water—heavy on the rum; babies were
quieted by copious doses of rum and opium, and so spent their infancy in a
happy fog; and able-bodied men, and women, too, for that matter, seldom went
more than a few hours without a drink.” 1 Daniel Okrent similarly portrays
America’s drinking history in his work, Last Call: The Rise and Fall of
Prohibition. He acknowledges that regardless of the reason, the modern drinking
culture is drastically different from that of earlier America. In the first chapters,
Okrent gives a synopsis of life in America before Prohibition, emphasizing the
early dependence on alcohol that had American adults “guzzling, per capita, a
staggering seven gallons of pure alcohol a year.” 2 He puts it into perspective by
equating the amount of alcohol consumed per nineteenth-century individual to
three times that of the typical American today.
Even so, a phenomenon soon occurred that would forever change the
drinking pattern. As poverty and oppression drove millions of immigrants from
Germany and Ireland to the country, they transformed the make-up and culture
of society. They introduced the inexpensive beer that changed the look of the
saloon culture, and heavy displays of public drinking became even more
acceptable. It was at this point in time that opponents of this rapidly expanding
1
Herbert Asbury, The Great Illusion: An Informal History of Prohibition (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1950), 4.
2
Daniel Okrent, Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition (New York: Scribner, 2010), 8.

46

Prohibition in America
drinking culture organized. These opponents were largely Christian
organizations and temperance leagues run by women, and it made sense that
these would be the groups to step forward. In their Drinking in America: A
History, Mark Edward and James Martin illustrate the climax of the alcohol
invasion. They ask, “How, for example, could the nation logically promote
better care for the mentally ill or the imprisoned if it allowed people to drink
themselves to insanity or to a life of crime?…It seemed impossible to cure
national ills without acknowledging the centrality of the liquor question.” 3 To
the nation’s drys, it seemed the answer to that question was endorsement for the
passage of the Eighteenth Amendment and the enforcement of a national
prohibition of alcohol. What ensued would rock the nation and introduce the
average American imagination then and ever after to the glamorous portrait of
the speakeasy and the bootlegger.
In order to judge the success or failure of Prohibition, it must be clear what
the goals of Prohibition truly were. Many authors have set out to say that the
ultimate goal of Prohibition was to stop all consumption and distribution of
alcohol. In this light, Prohibition is almost certainly a failure, as the one thing
historians agree on is the abundance of speakeasies lining the streets of every
major city in America. A 1933 newspaper article lamenting the evils of
Prohibition argued, “For many years, the American took his whiskey at the bar,
openly and unashamed. For fifteen years, he took what was sold in the
speakeasies as whiskey, furtively and in fear of thugs and raiders. In either case,
he has contracted a liking, perhaps a habit, and he will continue to desire his
whiskey.”4 It is hard to know exactly how many speakeasies there actually were,
and estimates are all over the map. Michael Lerner’s book, Dry Manhattan:
Prohibition in New York City, attempts to attach a number and struggles. His
estimates for Manhattan and Brooklyn alone range from roughly 15,000 to more
than twice that many, but nobody can be sure. 5 This is a glimpse into one of the
biggest problems with Prohibition numbers: it is hard to measure what is done in
secret. If Prohibition had very little chance of putting a complete end to the
liquor trade in America, perhaps the goal was more about lowering overall
consumption.
When looking at consumption, mortality rates due to cirrhosis, records of
rest homes and mental hospitals, and crime statistics are the general means by
which scholars can evaluate American drinking habits. These numbers are risky,
as they are often given without context and can be easily molded into
ammunition for propagandists. The statistics often lie about the real situation,
3
Mark Edward Lender and James Kirby Martin, Drinking in America: A History (New York:
Free Press, 1982), 66.
4
“The Saloon and the Speakeasy,” America 50, no. 4 (October 28, 1933): 75.
5
Michael A. Lerner, Dry Manhattan: Prohibition in New York City (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2008), 138.
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especially in the case of alcohol consumption, where illegal production of
alcohol may at times drastically rise while overall alcohol consumption remains
down over the entire decade. Quantitative historian Jeffery Miron describes the
problems behind the numbers in his work, The Effect of Alcohol Prohibition on
Alcohol Consumption. He explains the flaw with conclusions based on cirrhosis
deaths by arguing that, while the number of them decreased during Prohibition
and seem to indicate lower levels of consumption, World War I and the
following flu epidemic killed off a significant number of young men who would
have contributed most to the cirrhosis death rates had they lived longer. 6
Therefore, the decrease in that factor alone is susceptible to much suspicion.
Even so, in her 1998 work, Domesticating Drink: Women, Men, and
Alcohol in America, Catherine Murdock adamantly argues that Prohibition was
at least partially successful on the basis that consumption numbers were down.
She writes, “Americans in the first years of federal prohibition drank one-third
to one-half as much as they had a decade earlier…Even later in the decade
consumption rose to only two-thirds of that in the early 1910s.” 7 She cites then
recent research by Clark Warburton to produce these numbers and says that,
regardless of the amendment’s flaws, a drunken man was rare to see on the
streets of even most large cities after January 16, 1920.
Assuming that consumption was at least temporarily lower during
Prohibition, which even the most biased historian will generally concede, the
question then becomes whether the amendment or unrelated environmental
factors caused this decrease. Numerous sources argue that drinking was already
going down before 1920. As World War I created a need for labor and brought
change and substantial profit to America, the economy was not the only positive
change in its wake. In her work, Alcoholism in America: From Reconstruction to
Prohibition, Sarah Tracy argues that by 1919, a year before the amendment went
into action, “public drunkards had all but disappeared…The environment—with
its high employment rates and wartime restrictions on alcohol—appeared to
slow down the production of chronic drunkards.” 8 For many Americans of the
early twentieth century, their argument against Prohibition rested in a general
belief that the alcohol problem would most likely take care of itself. They had
seen the power of the Temperance Crusade on decreasing consumption by mere
suggestion, and many felt coercion would not be necessary. Tracy writes that by
the time Prohibition was in debate in Washington, “the number of inebriates was
already dropping—thanks to an expanding labor market—the state reasoned
with millennial optimism that habitual drunkenness would altogether vanish
6
Jeffrey A. Miron, The Effect of Alcohol Prohibition on Alcohol Consumption (Cambridge:
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999), 16.
7
Catherine Gilbert Murdock, Domesticating Drink: Women, Men, and Alcohol in America,
1870-1940 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1998), 94.
8
Sarah W. Tracy, Alcoholism in America: From Reconstruction to Prohibition (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University, 2005), 193.
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from sight.”9 Tracy is not the only one suspicious of the claims that Prohibition
caused the staggering drinking levels to lower from those in the century
preceding it. As Miron draws his own data to a close, he makes a similar
realization that the decrease may not be a result of government control. He states
that, though drinking did decline during the duration of the amendment, “this
does not prove what alcohol consumption would have been during the
Prohibition years in the absence of Prohibition.” 10
Still other historians believe that even if Prohibition was not the sole reason
people drank less, it at least changed how they drank, which perhaps was its goal
in the first place. The provision in the Volstead Act which allowed any alcohol
hoarded before January 17 for private consumption created two drastically
separate classes of American society: those who had the money and the space to
store enough alcohol for a decade of dryness and those who were at the mercy of
the speakeasy. At least for the first few years of Prohibition, drinking drove
many Americans home to their private stashes, thus giving the once liquorsaturated streets the appearance of sobriety. Murdock’s work hinges on this very
argument, and she states, “Federal prohibition effectively dismantled the public
drinking culture of the saloon and in this respect should be considered a
success.”11
The saloon culture of the nineteenth century seemed to many Americans
something worth killing. Though once perceived as fit settings for the mingling
of political ideas and fit spots of recreation for both the lower and the upper
classes, saloons gave way to a very different kind of meeting place produced by
the Industrial Revolution. Factory life and long hours of drudgery instilled in
many the desire to find escape, be it through a bottle or through one of the many
female patrons. Large factories brought numerous young, often unattached men
looking to spend their weekly wages on drink and riotous living, and, as for
which came first, the need for alcohol or the surplus of it, the drys seemed in a
general consensus that neither could survive without the other. In John Marshall
Barker’s 1905 work, The Saloon Problem and Social Reform, he argued, “The
supply of liquor creates the demand, and not, as in the case of necessities, the
demand the supply. In a multitude of ways it fosters and overstimulates a thirst
for drink.”12 Regardless of the public’s opinion on the place of the saloon in
society, no one could argue against the fact that they were on nearly every street
corner before Prohibition began. If the disappearance of saloons in major cities
was the goal, then Prohibition appeared to succeed, though the argument that the
saloon was replaced by the speakeasy is valid.
9

Ibid., 195.
Miron, The Effect of Alcohol Prohibition on Alcohol Consumption, 20.
11
Murdock, 88.
12
John Marshall Barker, The Saloon Problem and Social Reform (Boston: Everett Press, 1905),
10
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Understanding the true goal of Prohibition presents its own challenges. Not
only is the true goal hard to discern, its immediate results are equally difficult to
sift out. That is in part due to a major event that hurled itself into the public eye
in the fall of 1929—that is, the stock market crash that ushered in the Great
Depression. The people of the United States had not seen an economic downturn
to that extent before, and it seemed to some that the wets had been right all
along in saying Prohibition was too costly to keep up. Many felt the time had
finally come for everyone to pay for it.
However, the economy experienced a period of relative prosperity just after
the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment. A prominent economist of the time,
Irving Fisher, had named the illegalization of alcohol an economic success in his
1927 work, Prohibition at Its Worst. Even without proper enforcement, Fisher
contended that Prohibition had saved six billion dollars in the last year, seven
years after its start in 1920. Fisher argued, “If Prohibition enforcement cost us
even $1,000,000,000 a year, it would be well worth while purely as an economic
investment.”13 Fletcher Dobyns gives a similar defense in his 1940 work, The
Amazing Story of Repeal: An Exposé of the Power of Propaganda. He claims
that those who blamed the depression on Prohibition had fallen prey to wet
propaganda seeking repeal. He writes that they failed to see “that under
prohibition we had had ten years of unexplained prosperity, that the depression
was world-wide and due to causes with which prohibition had nothing to do, and
that it had come earlier and was more severe in countries like England and
Germany which were not ‘afflicted with prohibition.’” 14 Looking back, it is
likely that those arguing that the alcohol abeyance had produced a massive
economic catastrophe were wrong, but there were other more legitimate
accusations doubting Prohibition’s immediate results.
When asked to describe Prohibition, even the most unlearned student of
history will pepper his or her answer with depictions of gangsters roaming the
streets of major cities and the black market liquor trade. This is largely because
these things are known to have existed during the “dry decade,” and few can
argue that a rise in crime did not occur in the years of Prohibition enforcement
and lack thereof. This is often the central argument condemning Prohibition as
an embarrassment of history, as is the case with Edward Behr’s 1996 work,
Prohibition: Thirteen Years That Changed America. He introduces the book by
describing the climactic scene in the life of a man named George Remus who
shot his second wife, Imogene. Behr reveals little else about Remus’s life before
his violent act, but says only, “Prohibition itself was the real culprit,” bringing

13

Irving Fisher, Prohibition at Its Worst (New York: Alcohol Information Committee, 1927),

162.
14
Fletcher Dobyns, The Amazing Story of Repeal: An Exposé of the Power of Propaganda
(Chicago: Willett, Clark, 1940), 376.
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with it “irresistible temptations in the wake of unprecedented corruption.” 15 Behr
heavily implies that Prohibition provided the opportunity for otherwise good
men to become entangled in a world of seedy speakeasies and organized crime,
and perhaps he is right. There is no doubt that the number of homicides did in
fact rise after the enactment of Prohibition.
It is important, however, to look at the nature of the homicides and once
again look behind the numbers. In 2009, Mark Asbridge and Swarna
Weerasinghe published an article in which they looked at the data on homicides
involving alcohol and those unrelated slightly before and during Prohibition.
What they found was that, while non-alcohol-related homicides rose during
Prohibition, alcohol-related homicides remained steady. They argue, “If the rise
in total homicides is due to an increase in violent forms of conflict resolution,
the flat trend in alcohol-related homicides suggests that this increase is not a
direct product of the illicit production and sale of alcohol.” 16 Asbridge and
Weerasinghe further muse that overall homicides may have risen due to a
general trend towards violence in the twentieth century, and not due to
Prohibition at all. Dobyns also promoted this notion, declaring,
Every informed person knows that the gangster and the racketeer put in
their appearance fifty years before the adoption of the Eighteenth
Amendment, and that crimes of violence increased steadily during that
period. In the bitter struggle between laborers and employers that began
in the middle of the last century, the employers hired strikebreakers and
detectives and sluggers to protect their property, and the laborers
accepted this method of warfare. The gangsters and racketeers were
born of this struggle, although they were not exploited and dramatized
until they became the heroes of the wet propaganda.17
This once again proves how difficult it can be to discern Prohibition’s
immediate results. However, a possible result of Prohibition not examined
through questionable statistics is what Prohibition proponents deemed the
emergence of a more efficient working class. A principle outcry amongst the
drys against alcohol was that it robbed time and presence of mind, two
commodities esteemed higher than ever before with the onset of industrialization
and the values held by those who wanted to move up the economic ladder.
Lender and Martin comment on the brewing frustration with this wasteful trend,
saying, “The practice of whiling away hours in saloons, which had been
15
Edward Behr, Prohibition: Thirteen Years That Changed America (New York: Arcade,
2011), 3.
16
Mark Asbridge and Swarna Weerasinghe, “Homicide in Chicago from 1890 to 1930:
prohibition and its impact on alcohol- and non-alcohol-related homicides,” Addiction 104, no. 3
(March 2009): 361.
17
Dobyns, 370-71.
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harmless enough in the pre-industrial era, was to be avoided on
principle…According to the industrialists, wages should be put into savings,
investments, and manufactured goods.”18
One of the greatest problems a foreman faced was poor attendance of his
workers. These workers, often the poor, unattached immigrants who had
frequented the saloon in the days before Prohibition, often failed to show up for
work the day after. This was a practice the drys promised Prohibition would
eliminate, and economist Herman Feldman argued that it did. His 1927 work,
Prohibition: Its Economic and Industrial Aspects, admitted that, while little data
existed to analyze absences and work accidents related to alcohol, the position
of the boss was that Prohibition had cleaned up factory efficiency and
attendance. He wrote, “That industry has lately been suffering a good deal less
from irregular attendance caused by overindulgence than it did in the past is thus
the general testimony…There are numerous and emphatic statements, by
executives everywhere, that workers generally are steadier because of
prohibition.”19
When trying to determine Prohibition’s results, the scholar cannot help but
face cumbersome questions: why are there so many contradictions, and how do
so many historians reach drastically different conclusions from the same data?
Anyone hoping to delve into the murky depths of scholarship on Prohibition is
soon to discover that, apart from general surveys over the topic and miniscule
excerpts about it existing in other works, relatively little in-depth scholarship on
Prohibition actually exists. In fact, the majority of scholars have written about
the subject during three periods: the time surrounding and within Prohibition’s
actual enforcement, shortly after 1970, and in the years around the turn of the
twenty-first century. The interest in writing around the time of Prohibition is
easy to explain, but the spark of interest around 1970 is almost certainly in direct
response to another influential event in American history taking place at that
time.
The passage of the Controlled Substances Act as a part of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 caused a
heightened preoccupation in analyzing not just the prohibition of drugs but the
concept of prohibition in general. The proliferation of Prohibition scholarship
after the turn of the century is most likely directly related to renewed interest in
the question of drug legalization around this time. Assuming that highly
controversial, more current events drove these bursts of scholarship, it should
come as no surprise that finding an accurate and unbiased account of Prohibition
data is exceedingly difficult. No historian writing in the time directly
surrounding Prohibition could completely determine results that would take
18

Lender and Martin, 108.
Herman Feldman, Prohibition: Its Economic and Industrial Aspects (New York:
D.Appleton, 1930), 212.
19
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decades to confirm, and historians writing in tumultuous periods related to
prohibition of drugs are unable to write without the blinders of this separate
argument. Books abound that attempt to prove the evils of drug prohibition with
evidence of Prohibition’s own demise. Jeffery Miron and Jeffery Zwiebel
introduce their article, “Alcohol Consumption during Prohibition,” with a
comment about this very phenomenon. They state, “The burgeoning debate over
drug legalization in the United States has drawn renewed attention to the
nation’s experience with Prohibition…Prohibition provides a natural setting in
which to examine the impact of legal restrictions on the use of substances such
as alcohol or drugs.”20
Regardless of Prohibition’s role as the overlooked salvation of American
society or as a disruption of man’s inherent right to intemperance, Prohibition
was repealed. Whether it was repealed based on the insufficiency of positive
results or by outside factors is another debate, and the arguments are as various
and sundry as those on Prohibition’s results themselves. In Murdock’s argument
that Prohibition killed the saloon culture by driving drinking into the home, she
simultaneously concludes that Prohibition could not last because it did not
provide Americans with the positive aspects of the saloon that had once existed.
She writes, “Prohibition failed to produce substitutes for alcohol or the saloon,
despite warnings that people would continue to crave the companionship these
afforded.”21 Despite the obvious societal taboos woven into the saloon, its
disappearance may have in fact created a need for a social gathering place for
those same tired and lonely workers that had once frequented its doors.
Murdock is not the only one arguing that the saloon’s absence had to be
filled by something. Feldman’s economic look at Prohibition also commented
on the changes since the saloon’s departure, though he felt that more wholesome
industries were thus able to profit in its place. He mused, “Has the abolition of
the saloon augmented the popular demand for many other goods and services? It
appears that it has, that in the degree to which the change has been bad for the
saloon and liquor business, it was good for other trades catering to some of the
wants which the saloon satisfied.”22 He felt that theaters, ballparks, radios, and
Sunday drives stepped in to fill the void and provided the entertainment the
saloon once did.
Regarding reasons for the repeal, factors outside Prohibition’s possibly
negative immediate results had quite an influence on the decision. Although
historians can now see that Prohibition did not cause the Great Depression, the
Great Depression quite possibly brought an end to Prohibition. The stock market
crash of 1929 ushered in a decade of unemployment and wide scale poverty,
20
Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, “Alcohol consumption during Prohibition,” American
Economic Review 81, no. 2 (May 1991): 242.
21
Murdock, 127.
22
Feldman, 147.
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and, as this dragged on, people were less and less able to justify progressive
expenses aimed at improving the morality of a society that was struggling to
survive. Bread was worth more than temperance. As Lender and Martin explain,
“The battle over liquor paled before the monumental social problems resulting
from the depression. Just as an earlier generation of Americans had set aside the
dry crusade with the coming of the Civil War, so their twentieth-century
counterparts turned away from antiliquor agitation to tackle the awesome task of
national economic recovery.”23 As time passed, it also became harder to ignore
the amount of jobs that repeal would provide in breweries, bottling companies,
and bars. An example of that hope is evident in a New York Times article in
March of 1933, only months before the force for repeal finally triumphed. The
article claimed that while people expected many businesses to profit from the
legalization of alcohol, the only industries they expected to lose money were the
soft drink companies and, therefore, the sugar industry. 24 Still, many hoped that
the repeal of Prohibition would give the nation’s sputtering economy enough of
a kick start to propel it out of the depression. As they would soon see, the path to
recovery would be as complicated as the depression’s causes.
Another reason for Prohibition’s repeal was the serious lack of funding
provided for enforcement even from the start. Few seemed to realize the expense
attached to the enforcement of such laws at the time of their passage, something
Asbury comments on in his work. He contradicts Fisher’s earlier argument that
Prohibition had saved money. Asbury instead argues, “Enforcement would cost
at least three hundred million dollars a year. It was obvious that no such sum
would ever be provided, and it was equally obvious that the states would do
little or nothing.”25 He seems to place the failure of Prohibition not on an
increase of alcohol-related crime but on uncooperative state legislatures that,
even before the depression when the money was available, felt little need to fund
enforcement on a local level. Total prohibition of alcohol, in order to succeed,
would have required a level of support it never had.
When the Eighteenth Amendment passed, Prohibition was at a climax of
popularity that it could not maintain. Its subsequent failure was not necessarily
because of any evil the amendment produced but rather the indifference that
followed its initial success. Once the drys had their legal day, many acted as if
their job was done, but laws alone could not change a nation. Behr comments,
“Perhaps the least-learned lesson of Prohibition is that legislation alone is no
answer to America’s problems. The moralists and evangelical pioneers without
whom Prohibition would have remained a dead letter believed that enactment of

23
24
25

Lender and Martin, 167-68.
“Aid for Many Lines Seen in Legal Beer,” New York Times, March 19, 1933.
Asbury, 318.
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the Eighteenth Amendment would be sufficient to change the habits of
American society as a whole. They were quickly proved disastrously wrong.” 26
It became clearer why Prohibition consequences are difficult to delineate,
and why a close study reveals very few discernible results at all. Prohibition may
have done many things to lower consumption or it may have even raised crime.
The multiplicity of outside factors acting during the decade and affecting its
repeal strongly suggest that Prohibition did not cause the negative aftermath
many projected before it began or argued it had after its end. Testifying to this
are the two interesting occurrences on January 16, 1920 and December 5, 1933.
In the final weeks before enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment began, the
papers abounded with projections of a nation-wide binge that would take place
in the final hours before the Volstead Act’s enforcement. What actually
transpired on that night, however, was very different. Behr describes it, saying,
“Surprisingly, though a phenomenal amount of drinking took place all over
America on the night of January 16, the occasion failed to live up to reporters’
(and saloon keepers’) expectations.” 27 In his own survey of Prohibition, The
Long Thirst: Prohibition in America, 1920-33, Thomas Coffey also mentions,
“Throughout the country it was a surprisingly sober night. The national binge
which was widely expected did not take place. Even New York, a city
prohibitionists considered the modern-day Gomorrah, was relatively sedate
during the last hours of legal liquor on January 16, 1920.”28 Some argue that the
only reason the binge did not take place was that so many had already stored up
enough alcohol in their homes to keep them out of the streets, but that does not
explain the similar lack of celebration at Prohibition’s end on December 5, 1933.
Once again, journalists scoured the streets looking for phenomenal excess,
and, once again, they found none. They had expected bar brawls and drunken
celebrations spilling out into the streets, but Coffey comments that major cities
like Boston and Philadelphia were quiet the night that Utah became the last state
to ratify. Even in New York, where many had expected celebrations to rapidly
escalate, the New York Times reported that “with the city’s entire police force of
19,000 men mobilized to guard against overexuberant celebrants, arrests did not
exceed the normal number for any day of the last five years.” 29 A reporter on the
celebrations in Times Square said, “The crowds were orderly and mildly amused
at the photographers’ flashlights and the trucks unloading spirits, but they were
only slightly larger than on a good Saturday night, and the 200 extra policemen
assigned to the district had little to do.”30 This lack of activity suggests that
Prohibition came and went with little impact. The hardened drinkers were
26

Behr, 242.
Ibid., 81.
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Norton, 1975), 3.
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determined to drink regardless of the law, and much of society chose to abstain
with or without enforcement. The only far-reaching result of Prohibition was a
change in the national perception of public drinking and general consumption.
However, it was probably not a direct result of Prohibition so much as the
temperance sentiment brought about by the Temperance Crusade long before
January 16, 1920. Furthermore that sentiment continued to have impact
sometime after December 5, 1933.
This is the position that Pamela Pennock and K. Austin Kerr take in their
article, “In the Shadow of Prohibition: Domestic American Alcohol Policy since
1933.” They see Prohibition as largely defective both in enforcement and in
stimulating a crime wave that introduced the average, middle class citizen to
lawless bootlegging, but they see the temperance sentiment that started it all as
having a lasting impact on America’s relationship with alcohol. They argue that
even once the nation repealed the Eighteenth Amendment, “the consumption
level of alcoholic beverages remained a disappointment to their suppliers and
tax collectors…Drinking had increased by the end of the 1930s, but remained
largely flat thereafter, partly as a result of the ageing of the population, but also
because of enduring values of temperance.” 31 Even this result, however, does
not extend to today, and by the 1970s, Pennock and Kerr note that Americans
returned to drinking as much as they had before Prohibition ever took place.
Herbert Asbury, the writer of what was probably the most in-depth and
earliest account of those thirteen sober years, concluded The Great Illusion with
an interesting final thought on what Herbert Hoover deemed “the noble
experiment.” Asbury writes, “Well, of course, there are now no ‘saloons’ in the
United States. Instead there are bars, taverns, grills, and cocktail lounges. But by
and large it is the same old rose with the same old smell.” 32 He was right. A
thorough study shows that the results many once blamed on the amendment,
including increased consumption, economic downturn, and high crime, were not
results of Prohibition at all but of outside factors. While it had temporarily
lowered consumption and proved efficient to an extent, Prohibition had changed
next to nothing permanently.
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